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RECENT DECISIONS
CRIMINAL LAW-INSANITY-PRODUCT OF MENTAL DISEASE TEST-
DEGREE OF CAUSALITY NECESSARY TO ACQUIT.
Douglas v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1956).
Defendant was indicted for two separate robberies. He pleaded not
guilty in each case and petitioned for a lunacy inquiry. He was com-
mitted and at the end of twenty-one months was adjudged competent to
stand trial. At separate trials for each robbery, defendant was convicted.
On appeal it was held that the juries should have had a reasonable doubt
that defendant's unlawful acts were not the product of mental disease.
The court in so holding gave a definite meaning to the word "product"
in the "product of mental disease" test of insanity now in force in the
District of Columbia 1 when it said that the juries were unwarranted "in
reaching an abiding conviction that the abnormal mental condition definitely
ascertained . . . was not a cause without which the . . . robberies
would not have occurred." (Emphasis supplied) Douglas v. United
States (D.C. Cir. 1956).2
Where insanity is raised as a defense at a criminal trial, the right-
wrong test of criminal responsibility is the sole test in England and in
twenty-nine American jurisdictions. At least fourteen states have added
the irresistible impulse test to the right-wrong test.3  These two tests
have been formulated in various ways by different courts. The gist of
the right-wrong test is that the defendant will not be criminally responsible
if owing to a disease of the mind he was unable to know the difference
between right and wrong with regard to the particular act charged or
was unable to know the nature and quality of his act.4 The irresistible
impulse test states that despite the ability to know the nature and quality
of the act and to know that it was wrong, the defendant will not be
responsible if owing to the duress of mental disease his actions were not
subject to the control of his will.5 These combined tests have long been
1. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
2. Douglas v. United States, 25 U.S.L. WEEK 2214 (Nov. 9, 1956). Quotations
are from the unpublished opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit.
3. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DErZNSz 51 (1954).
4. Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 115 A.2d 502 (1955).
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the rule in federal jurisdictions.6 The District of Columbia is a recent
exception, having adopted, in Durham v. United States,7 the "product of
mental disease" test which has been the law in New Hampshire since
1871.8 No state or federal jurisdiction has followed the District of
Columbia in its adoption of the new test in criminal cases." The rule is
formulated: "an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act
was the product of mental disease or defect." 10 The word "product"
connotes causality " but the degree of causal connection that must exist
between disease and act is not set forth in the Durham case. The instant
case contains the first judicial determination of the concept of causality as
applied to this test.
In the instant case the court says that the juries were unwarranted
"in reaching an abiding conviction that the abnormal mental condi-
tion . . . was not a cause without which the . . . robberies would
not have occurred." 12 This means that the degree of causality must be
such that but for its presence the act would not have occurred. In terms
of reasonable doubt, the jury, to acquit, must doubt that the act would
have occurred had there been no disease. In other words, the jury finding
a causal connection between disease and act must ask themselves further
if the act would have occurred in the absence of disease. If they come
to a firm conviction that the act would have taken place anyway, they
must convict. If they are reasonably unable to give an affirmative answer,
they must acquit, even though they have found that there was a lesser
causal connection. Once mental disease is established the jury can convict
(1) if there is no causal connection between the disease and the act; or
(2) despite the presence of some causal connection, if they are convinced
that the act would have occurred anyway. Under such an interpretation
of the word "product" it is difficult to see how a conviction could ever
be returned once the presence of mental disease is established. The
"integrated personality" theory spoken of in Durham would seem to
negative the possibility of any finding other than not guilty by reason of
insanity. For under that theory, a mental disease would not be a malady
limited to one compartment of the defendant's make-up but would affect
6. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895); Howard v. United States, 232
F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1956).
7. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
8. State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871).
9. The cases which have considered the Durham test without adopting it fall into
four groups: (1) reject it on its merits, Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 115 A.2d 502
1955) ; (2) consider it a problem for the legislature, People v. Berry, 44 Cal.2d 426,
282 P.2d 861 (1955) ; (3) prefer to await a determination by the Supreme Court, And-
erson v. United States, 237 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Howard v. United States, 232
F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1956) ; (4) give no reason, State v. Kitchen, 286 P.2d 1079 (Mont.
1955).
10. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-875 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
11. "The question will be simply whether the accused acted because of mental
disease. . . ." Id. at 876.
12. Unpublished opinion of the court at p. 13.
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his whole personality. A jury would be hard put to find that there was
no causal relation between a diseased personality and the acts proceeding
from that personality. Nor could they be convinced that such person would
have done the act despite the fact that his mental condition did have
some effect on his act. It is submitted that the interpretation given the
word "product" in the instant case when considered in the light of the
psychological theory of the Durham case, constitutes no advance in the law
prior to Durham. At least under the right-wrong test coupled with the
irresistible impulse test it could be determined that, if the defendant knew
the difference between right and wrong and was able to control himself,
his mental condition was not the primary cause of his unlawful act and
that he, therefore, is criminally responsible. It may also be observed that,
despite the court's formulation of the test, and its reversal on that basis,
there is another element in the court's thinking that seems to be the real
reason for reversal. The court goes on to say "we are constrained to
conclude that it would be inconsistent with applicable legal standards to
hold on the records as presently constituted that punishment for criminal
conduct, rather than treatment for a mental disease, was the proper
remedy." 13 This is a basic sociological consideration, and one of great
importance. It is pointed out by the court that one committed for treat-
ment of a mental disorder is not returned to society until he may safely
do so; whereas one imprisoned returns at the end of his sentence whether
he is ready for a law-abiding life or not.14 Important as this considera-
tion is, it is not the legal test of criminal responsibility.. To uphold the
convictions in the present case would not be to hold that punishment rather
than treatment is the proper remedy, it would simply be to hold that the
defendant was criminally responsible.
Anthony J. Ryan
CRIMINAL LAW-THE ELEMENT OF INTENT IN BIGAMY-
MISTAKE OF FACT AS A DEFENSE.
People v. Vogel (Cal. 1956).
Defendant was convicted of bigamy under the California Penal Code.'
The trial court refused to admit evidence tending to show that the defend-
ant's first wife had married another before his second marriage and
excluded defendant's testimony of his first wife's statement to him that she
was going to divorce him. On appeal, the supreme court reversed and
held that the exclusion of defendant's evidence and testimony was prejudicial
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., n. 12.
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error because it deprived him of the defense of a bona fide reasonable belief,
that facts leaving him free to remarry existed. People v. Vogel, 299 P.2d
850 (Cal. 1956) .2
At common law a crime consisted of two elements, an evil intention
and an unlawful action. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.3  This has
been said to be a universal doctrine 4 notwithstanding the fact that in many
statutory offenses a guilty mind is unnecessary.5 Prior to 1604, bigamy
or polygamy, as it is sometimes called,6 was punished only by the eccle-
siastical courts.' In that year, it was, by statute, made a crime punishable
in the civil courts.' As bigamy is a statutory and not a common-law crime,
controversy has arisen as to the necessity of a guilty mind when the
statute is silent on the subject. Generally, whether or not a criminal intent
is a necessary element of a statutory offense is a matter of construction to be
determined from the language of the statute in view of its manifest purpose
and designY The majority of American courts seem to hold that a guilty
mind is not necessary to commit the crime of bigamy in the absence of words
in the statute to the contrary."' These cases proceed on the theory that
the legislature may forbid the doing of an act and make its commission
criminal without regard to intent 11 or that a party doing an act which a
statute has made criminal is automatically chargeable with the criminal
intent of doing it.12  These cases reject a good faith mistake of fact as a
2. People v. Vogel, 299 P.2d 850 (Cal. 1956).
3. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); People v. Connors, 253 Ill.
266, 97 N.E. 643 (1912) ; 1 BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL LAW §290 (8th ed. 1892).
4. 1 BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL LAW § 291 (8th ed. 1892).
5. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) (sale of narcotics) ; People v. Sobel-
man, 199 Minn. 232, 271 N.W. 484 (1937) (permitting minor to remain in tavern) ;
Tenement House Dep't v. McDevitt, 215 N.Y. 160, 109 N.E. 88 (1915) (prohibited use
of tenement house). See also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-260 (1952)
where the court analyzes the development of these various statutory offenses not requir-
ing mens rea. But see 1 BISHOP, NEw CRIMINAL LAW § 291 (8th ed. 1892) where it is
stated that these statutory offenses are not really exceptions to the doctrine requiring
evil intent in the commission of a crime. The author explains that in these offenses the
form alone is criminal while the matter is civil, and, therefore, the full rules of criminal
law do not apply; cf. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. RFV. 55, 72-75
(1933) ; Hall, Prolegomena to a Science of Criminal Law, 89 U. PA. L. Rzv. 549, 568-
569 (1941).
6. State v. Armington, 25 Minn. 29, 38 (1878). See also Toncray v. Budge, 14
Idaho 621, 95 Pac. 26, 34 (1908).
7. CLARK, CRIMINAL LAW § 116 (3d ed. 1915); MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW § 133
(1934).
8. Statute of James I, 1604, 1 Jac. I, c. 2. See also 4 BLACKSrONE, COMMENTARI4S
*164.
9. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) ; State v. Kuehnle, 85 N.J.L. 220,
88 Atl. 1085 (1913) ; cf. Masters v. United States, 42 App. D.C. 350 (1914) in which
it is stated that, where an act is by statute made a crime, the statute should be con-
strued in the light of the common law, and, that, while it is within the power of the
legislature to declare an act criminal, irrespective of the intent with which it is done,
a statute will not be construed to have that effect unless it clearly appears that such is
the legislative intent. See also 1 BISHOP, NEw CRIMINAL LAW § 291 (b) (8th ed. 1892).
10. People v. Spoor, 235 Ill. 230, 85 N.E. 207 (1908) ; State v. Goonan, 89 N.H.
528, 3 A.2d 105 (1938).
11. State v. Armington, 25 Minn. 29 (1878) ; State v. Lindsey, 26 N.M. 526, 194
Pac. 877 (1921).
12. Commonwealth v. Mash, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 472 (1844) (criticized in McMur-
ray, Changing Conceptions of Law and of Legal Institutions, 3 CALIF. L. Rzv. 441, 452
266 [VOL. 2.
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defense. 18 However, there are some courts which allow the defense of
mistake of fact to an indictment for bigamy,1 4 the accused having the burden
of proving a reasonable and good faith mistake.15 The California bigamy
statute, under which the indictment in the instant case was brought, does
not expressly exclude the element of intent from the crime of bigamy. 16
The court interprets this omission in the light of two other sections of the
penal code 17 and says that it is clear "that such an omission was not meant
to exclude intent as an element of the crime but to shift to the defendant
the burden of proving that he did not have the requisite intent." 18
The decision in the instant case is against the weight of authority and
necessitated the overruling of one case and the disapproval of another which
were consistent with the prevalent view. 19 However, the position taken
by the court does not come as a complete surprise. There seem to be few,
if any, reasons to support the practice of construing similarly the statutory
crime of bigamy and statutory offenses not requiring a guilty mind,
especially in view of the fact that bigamy is wholly unlike the latter. Also,
the elimination of the guilty mind from bigamy merely because a statute
is silent on the subject would seem to be an indiscriminate act. To do so is
to impute to the legislature a perfection and completeness of expression
that is generally not found in legislation. Finally, it appears inconsistent
that among serious crimes involving heavy penalties, moral obloquy, and
damage to reputation, bigamy is maintained in the unique position of being
indictable without a showing of the existence of a guilty mind or moral
blameworthiness. The Supreme Court of the United States has said that
the line has not been drawn between crimes which require a guilty mind
and those which do not.2° If such a line is to be drawn, it would appear
that bigamy should stand on that side requiring a guilty mind.
Michael J. Dempsey
(1915) and in Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. Rev. 55, 74 (1933))
State v. Zichfeld, 23 Nev. 304, 46 Pac. 802 (1896). But see MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW
§ 20(h) Where this theory is said to be "an unnecessary resort to fiction and sophistry."
13. Ellison v. State, 100 Fla. 736, 129 So. 887, (1930) ; State v. Trainer, 232 Mo.
240, 134 S.W. 528 (1911) ; State v. Hendrickson, 67 Utah 15, 245 Pac. 375 (1926).
14. Squire v. State, 46 Ind. 459 (1874) ; Baker v. State, 86 Neb. 775, 126 N.W.
300 (1910).
15. State v. Cain, 106 La. 708, 31 So. 300 (1902).
16. "Every person having a husband or wife living, who marries any other person,
• . . is guilty of bigamy." CAL. PEN. CODE § 281 (Deering 1949).
17. "In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation
of act and intent, or criminal negligence." CAL. P4N. CODn § 20 (Deering 1949). "All
persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the following
classes:
"(4) Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged under an ig-
norance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent." CAL. PEN. CODS
§ 26 (Deering 1949).
18. People v. Vogel, 229 P.2d 850, 853 (Cal. 1956). The court further stated that
"guilty knowledge, which was formerly a part of the definition of bigamy was omitted
from section 281 to reallocate the burden of proof in a bigamy trial." Id. at 854.
19. People v. Hartman, 130 Cal. 487, 62 Pac. 823 (1900) (overruled) ; People v.
Kelly, 32 Cal.App.2d. 624, 90 P.2d 605 (1939) (disapproved).
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EQUITY-INJUNCTION-JURISDICTION OF EQUITY
TO RESTRAIN DIVORCE SUIT.
Dumais v. Durais (Me. 1956).
Plaintiff brought a bill in equity to enjoin his wife from proceeding
further with a divorce action in which she also sought custody of their
four minor children. The plaintiff's theory was that his wife's suit was
violative of an antenuptial contract whereby she agreed not to seek a divorce
and also to raise any children born to them in the Roman Catholic faith;
that this contract was not available as a defense in the divorce action; and
thus, there was no adequate remedy at law. The defendant's demurrer
to the bill was sustained and the bill was dismissed. On appeal, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed and held that the controversy
was not a proper subject for equity jurisdiction since by statute jurisdiction
was vested in the law courts. Durnais v. Dunmais, 122 A.2d 322 (Me.
1956).1
It was formerly held that equity jurisdiction was based on the existence
of a property right.2 This view stems from what appears to be an
erroneous interpretation3 of the case of Gee v. Pritchard.4 In time most
courts began to grant equity jurisdiction in cases which really concerned
personal rights through a somewhat tortuous interpretation of the concept
of property rights.5 Today, most courts frankly hold that cases involving
only personal rights are a fit subject for equity jurisdiction.0 A funda-
mental requisite to the exercise of equity jurisdiction is the lack of an
adequate remedy at law.7 At common law, an equitable defense was in-
admissible in an action at law.' Today, however, as a result of the enact-
ment of the new codes of procedure (which began with the Field Code
in 1848 in New York), most states have a provision,9 as does Maine,'
permitting a defendant to raise all of his defenses, both legal and equitable,
in one action. Under the new procedural codes there is little if any occa-
1. Dumais v. Dumais, 122 A.2d 322 (Me. 1956).
2. Chappell v. Stewart, 82 Md. 323, 33 Atl. 542 (1896) ; Beach v. Bryan, 155 Mo.
App. 33, 133 S.W. 635 (1911).
3. See Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29
HARV. L. REv. 640, 642 (1916).
4. 2 Swanst. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (Ch. 1818).
5. Grand Int'l Brotherhood L. Engineers v. Mills, 43 Ariz. 379, 31 P.2d 971(1934) ; Ex parte Warfield, 40 Tex. Crim. 413, 50 S.W. 933 (1899).
6. Berrien v. Pollitzer, 165 F.2d 21 (D.C.Cir.1947) ; Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf
Club, 30 Cal.2d 110, 180 P.2d 321 (1947) ; Everett v. Harron, 380 Pa. 123, 110 A.2d
383 (1955).
7. Savage v. Iowa Development Co., 130 F. Supp. 42 (D. Minn. 1955) ; York v.
McCausland, 130 Me. 245, 154 Atl. 780 (1931); Michelson v. Dwyer, 158 Neb. 427,
63 N.W.2d 513 (1954).
8. Braddick v. Thompson, 8 East 344, 103 Eng. Rep. 374 (K.B. 1806) ; Scholey v.
Mearns, 7 East 148, 103 Eng. Rep. 56 (K.B.1806).
9. See 1 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 40 (5th ed. 1941).
10. Mn. Rev. STAT. ANN. C. 113 § 18 (1954).
268 [VOL. 2.
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sion 11 for the defendant in an action to seek to have the plaintiff enjoined
from the prosecution thereof, since whatever is to form the basis of the
injunction may be raised as a defense to the plaintiff's suit.12
Since the plaintiff in the instant case can raise all his defenses in the
action he seeks to have enjoined, he has an adequate remedy at law; hence,
the court correctly dismissed his bill. A more interesting aspect of the
case is presented by the antenuptial agreement. Although antenuptial con-
tracts are not mentioned as a defense in the divorce statute, apparently the
defenses listed are not intended to be exclusive, since only legal defenses
appear.' 3 However, regardless of the way in which this defense is raised,
it seems safe to conclude that it will not be enforced. The marriage con-
tract creates a status in which the state, as well as the parties, has an
interest. 1 4  The enactment of a divorce statute creates a policy under
which, if the requisite grounds exist, a party has the right to have the
marriage dissolved. Permitting the parties to avoid this enactment denies
the state's interest in the marriage and allows the parties to substitute their
policy for that of the state. Thus, to enforce such an agreement on behalf
of one of the parties is to concede his independence of a law expressly
passed to protect a state interest. The enforcement of it would tend to
promote the very wrongs for which the state has decided a divorce is in
order. Although the indissolubility of marriage is certainly a worthy ob-
jective, it can not be guaranteed in this fashion.
Joseph M. Smith
INFANTS-CONTRACT TO PURCHASE A CHATTEL DISAFFIRMED-BURDEN
OF PROOF TO SHOW ABILITY TO RETURN CONSIDERATION.
Rotondo v. Kay Jewelry Co., 123 A.2d 404 (R.I. 1956).
The nineteen year old plaintiff purchased a diamond engagement ring
from the defendant, revealing his age and purpose at the time of sale.
Installment payment was arranged. The engagement was terminated and
11. Depending upon the code provisions in the instant jurisdiction there are three
possible classes of cases wherein a defendant, to raise his defense, must institute his own
action in equity. See 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1370-1373 (5th ed. 1941).
12. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 101 Me. 585, 65 A.2d 22 (1906) ; Miller v.
Waldoborough Packing Co., 88 Me. 605, 34 Atl. 527 (1896).
13. The defenses listed are collusion, adultery by both parties, and certain matters
of residence. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. C. 166, § 55 (1954).
14. Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480 (1863). Based on this interest the various states
have enacted divorce statutes which permit a married person to rid himself of his
partner, for certain of specified causes, and then remarry. This is a misinterpretation
of the state's interest. Both divine law and the natural law forbid the granting of
divorce with the right to remarry. See ST. MAYTHEw's GOSPEL, C. 9, v. 6 for the
former and HIGGINS, MAN AS MAN, p. 387 (1949), for the latter. However, Americanjurisprudence has adopted the principle that a state has such a right. Hence, an ante-
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the minor disaffirmed the purchase. Subsequently he brought an action for
the return of $93.39 paid before disaffirmance. The trial court, without a
jury, found that the plaintiff had not proved by a fair preponderance of
evidence that he was unable to return the ring. The Supreme Court of
Rhode Island reversed and held that the burden of proof was upon the
seller to show the infant's ability to return the ring. Rotondo v. Kay
Jewelry Co., 123 A.2d 404 (R.I. 1956). 1
The right of an infant to avoid his contracts is well founded on a policy
to guard minors against their own imprudence. 2 Where the minority of
the buyer was revealed at the time of purchase, return or tender of return
of the goods is not a condition precedent to his right to disaffirm and recover
his payments, if he is unable to return the goods.3 However, he is obliged
to return any part of the goods which are still under his control.4  Such
return or an accounting is held in some jurisdictions as a condition precedent
to disaffirmance,5 in others it is a condition precedent only to recovery
of payment made.6 Since the risk of nonpersuasion of a fact generally
rests upon the litigant whose cause of action requires that fact by force of
the substantive law,7 those jurisdictions which require the infant plaintiff
to account for or return what he can before he will be allowed to recover
place the risk upon the infant to show his inability to make the return.
8
This court says that to require the minor to risk not persuading the jury
of his inability to return the ring, in effect, imposes a condition precedent
to his recovery, and that this is against the protective policy of the sub-
stantive law.
By the same token, this court, in effect, is saying that the minor can
recover even though able to return the ring so long as the vendor cannot
persuade the jury that the minor is able to return it. Thus, instead of
apportioning the risk on the basis of procedural policy-that the infant
should be indulged with every fair procedural advantage 9 or that a litigant
should not have the burden of proving a negative 0 -the instant case ex-
1. Rotondo v. Kay Jewelry Co., 123 A.2d 404 (R.I. 1956).
2. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 235 (rev. ed. 1936).
3. MacGreal v. Taylor, 167 U.S. 688, 698 (1897); Friedman v. Huber, 92 Pa.
Super. 245, 246 (1927) ; McGuckian v. Carpenter, 43 R.I. 94, 110 Atl. 402, 403 (1920).
4. In re Huntenberg, 153 Fed. 768, 769, 770 (E.D. N.Y. 1907) ; Yubas v. Witaskis,
95 Pa. Super. 296, 300 (1928) ; McGuckian v. Carpenter, 43 R.I. 94, 110 AtI. 402, 403
(1920).
5. Standard Motors, Inc. v. Raue, 37 Ala. App. 211, 65 So.2d 829, 830 (1953);
Mosko v. Forsythe, 102 Colo. 115, 76 P.2d 1106, 1107 (1938) ; Shellabarger v. Jacobs,
316 Ill. App. 191, 45 N.E.2d 184, 186 (1942); 1 WILLIS TON, CONTRACTS § 237 (rev. ed.
1936).
6. Sassenrath v. Lewis Motor Co., 246 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Mo. 1952); Pieri v.
Nebbia, 178 Misc. 388, 34 N.Y.S.2d 317, 319 (Monroe County Ct. 1942).
7. 9 WIGMORt, EVIDNCE § 2485, at 273 (3d ed. 1940).
8. Mosko v. Forsythe, 102 Colo. 115, 76 P.2d 1106, 1107 (1938); Whitman v.
Allen, 123 Me. 1, 121 Atl. 160, 162 (1923); 6 AM. JUR. LgGAL FORMS ANNOTA _D§ 988 (1954). Contra, 6 ANDERSON, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL PRACTICE § 907 (1951).
9. There is some support for this view: Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Dukes, 121
Ga. 787, 49 S.E. 788, 791 (1905) ; Britton v. South Penn Oil Co., 73 W.Va. 792, 81
S.E. 525,528 (1914).
10. 9 WicMoRE, EvIDENCE § 2486, at 274 (3d ed. 1940).
[VOL. 2.
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tends a protective policy at a time when nineteen year old males need it,
perhaps, less than ever before. In doing so, the court cites only two cases
neither of which lends much support to its view." Unless there is some
other possible action for the vendor, contemplated 12 though not indicated
in its opinion, this court departs from the weight of authority.' 8
Thomas E. Eichman
INTERNAL REVENUE-DEDUCTIONS-LEGITIMATE EXPENSES OF
ILLEGITIMATE BUSINESS.
Commissioner v. Doyle (7th Cir. 1956).
Respondent was engaged in an illegal gambling business, the operation
of a handbook in Illinois. He paid rent for a room in Chicago, where he
accepted, recorded and paid the wagers. In the conduct of this business,
he paid wages to several employees. The Tax Court of the United States
allowed these expenses, for rent and wages, to be deducted from the re-
spondent's gross income as ordinary and necessary expenses even though
they were contrary to declared public policy of the State of Illinois. On
appeal by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue this ruling was affirmed.'
Commissioner v. Doyle, 231 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1956).
Section 23 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 2 in setting forth what
trade or business expenses may be deducted from gross income in comput-
ing net income makes no distinction between lawful and unlawful disburse-
ments. The deduction of such expenses depends on the innate character
of the item itself.8  The Tax Court has held in the past that the "legitimate
expenses of an illegitimate business" are deductible, in contradistinction to
those expenses which are not deductible because contrary to public policy.
4
The Supreme Court has affirmed this policy,5 and has indicated that it
is not the purpose of the tax laws to penalize illegal business by taxing
11. McGuckian v. Carpenter, 43 R.I. 94, 110 Atl. 402 (1920) (Infant was unable
to make a return, so the court said "the right of an infant to avoid his contract is
absolute and paramount to all equities," but in dictum it said that if he could have made
return, infant would have had to do so). Chandler v. Simmons, 97 Mass. 508 (1867)
(Infant was unable to make return. No question of burden of proof was involved).
12. See McCarty-Green Motor Co. v. McCheney, 219 Ala. 211, 121 So. 713 (1929).
13. See Goble, Infants' Contracts for the Sale of Chattels, 20 ILL. L. Rev. 343,
347, 348, 350 (1925).
1. Commissioner v. Doyle, 213 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1956).
2. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(a), 53 STAT. 47 (now INT. Rtv. CODE or 1954,
§ 162(a)).
3. Cohen v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1949).
4. Anthony Cornero Stralla, 9 T.C. 801 (1947).




Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1957
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
gross rather than net income." However, the generally accepted meaning
of the language used in the statute authorizing deductions of trade or busi-
ness expenses has been narrowed "in order that tax deduction consequences
might not frustrate sharply defined national and state policies proscribing
particular types of conduct." 7 But, the policies frustrated must be evi-
denced by some governmental declaration of them.8 The Commissioner is
not required, therefore, to use the "ordinary and necessary" test to disallow
the deduction. The deduction is not permitted if the payment itself is
illegal,9 or, though not illegal, is itself contrary to public policy.Y' In a
recent case arising in Illinois," the Tax Court held that such payments
as in the instant case are not deductible, because the payments themselves
have been declared illegal by an Illinois statute, 12 and hence the payment
of wages may itself be a crime.'3 The Tax Court and the court of appeals
in the instant case did not rely on the statute, but seemed to follow the
weight of authority in classifying and allowing these disbursements as
ordinary and necessary expenses of an albeit unlawful business.
It seems well established that some expenses of an unlawful business
are deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses. The present
problem lies in predicting exactly which expenses will be considered de-
ductible. Any expense which is considered to be against public policy, or
illegal, may not be deducted, even though ordinary and necessary. Thus,
the difficulty becomes one of ascertaining which expenses are against public
policy, and which are not; and which expenses are illegal, and which are
not. The Commissioner will no doubt continue to object to any deduction
that is in any way connected with an illegal business. While this attitude
might be receiving new emphasis in the Treasury Department, 14 it is
6. Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
7. Id. at 473.
8. Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952).
9. Fuller v. Commissioner, 213 F.2d 102 (10th Cir. 1954) (Loss denied for cost of
liquor confiscated because sold in violation of Oklahoma law).
10. Rugel v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1942) (Payments to secure
political influence disallowed).
11. Sam Mesi, 25 T.C. 513 (1955).
12. "That any person who keeps any room, shed, tenement, tent, booth, or building,
or any part thereof, or who occupies any place upon any public or private grounds
within this state, with any book, instrument or device for the purpose of recording or
registering bets or wagers, or selling pools, or any person who records or registers bets
or wagers, or sells pools upon the result of any trial or contest of skill, speed or power
of endurance of man or beast, or upon the result of any political nomination, appoint-
ment or election, or being the owner, lessee or occupant of any room, shed, tenement,
tent, booth, or building, or part thereof, knowingly permits the same to be used or
occupied for any of these purposes, or therein keeps, exhibits or employs any device
or apparatus for the purpose of recording or registering such bets or wagers, or selling
of such pools, or becomes the custodian or depository for hire or privilege, of any
money, property, or thing of value staked, wagered or pledged upon any such result,
shall be punishable .... " ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, § 336 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
13. While heavily relied on to disallow the deduction, the statute does not seem to
be specific as to whether payment of wages is itself a crime.
14. "Our policy will henceforth be to disallow all deductions for expenses incurred
in illegal enterprise, and the Treasury Department has promised us its fullest cooper-
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doubtful that the courts will go so far. Perhaps the Supreme Court will
take action and establish a more precise test than legality or public policy,
if that is possible. This would be most welcome. As Justice Brandeis
stated, "In most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law
be settled than that it be settled right." 15
Thomas F. Burns
JURISDICTION-DIVORCE-ALLOWANCE OF MAINTENANCE BASED ON
YEAR'S RESIDENCE SUBSEQUENT TO HUSBAND'S Ex PARTE DIVORCE.
Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt (N.Y. 1956).
The husband, then domiciled in Nevada, and the wife, then domiciled
in California, were married in Connecticut and established a California
domicile until their separation. The defendant husband brought a suit
for divorce in Nevada, in which the wife did not appear or answer, and
the suit resulted in a divorce decree for the husband. One month prior
to the commencement of the husband's suit, the plaintiff wife took up
residence in New York. After more than a year's residence in New
York, the wife, effecting service through publication and sequestration
of the husband's New York assets, commenced action in New York for
separation on the grounds of cruelty and abandonment, and for an award
of alimony. The New York Court of Appeals, in a 5-2 decision,' held
that while the husband was obtaining a Nevada divorce in an in rem
proceeding the wife could begin satisfying New York residence requirements
and later institute suit for maintenance under section 1170-b of the Civil
Practice Act.2  Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 1 N.Y.2d 342, 135 N.E.2d 553
(N.Y. 1956). 3
Under the rule of Haddock v. Haddock 4 full faith and credit did
not require that the courts of one state recognize foreign ex parte divorce
15. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 406 (1932) (dissenting opinion).
1. The dissenting juctices were of the opinion that section 1170-b of the Civil
Practice Act could be applied consistently with the dictates of the full faith and credit
clause only where the earlier ex parte judgment of divorce did not purport to adjudi-
cate the absent wife's right to alimony. They felt that the Nevada decree in this case
had terminated this right. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 135 N.E.2d 553, 560 (N.Y. 1956).
2. "In an action for divorce, separation or annulment, or for a declaration of nul-
lity of a void marriage, where the court refuses to grant such relief by reason of a
finding by the court that a divorce, annulment or judgment declaring the marriage a
nullity had previously been granted to the husband in an action in which jurisdiction
over the person of the wife was not obtained, the court may, nevertheless, render in
the same action such judgment as justice may require for the maintenance of the wife."
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 1170-b.
3. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, I N.Y.2d 342, 135 N.E.2d 553 (N.Y. 1956).
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decrees. Then in the first case of Williams v. North Carolina,5 the Su-
preme Court held that full faith and credit" must be given to ex parte
divorce decrees obtained in sister states. The second case of Williams v.
North Carolina 7 held that while full faith and credit must be given to this
type decree, the forum could inquire into the jurisdiction of the foreign
state to ascertain whether a bona fide domicile had been established.
Subsequently, New York, in the case of Estin v. Estin 8 held that while
full faith and credit had to be given to the decree of dissolution of the
marriage, alimony was an in personam element of the decree and since the
Nevada court had no personal jurisdiction over the wife, her prior New
York judgment of permanent alimony was unaffected by the Nevada
decree. This was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court.9  Thus,
the doctrine of "divisible divorce" was established.", In Armstrong v.
Armstrong" the doctrine was extended to include subsequent alimony
judgments. This doctrine, while not previously unknown, 12 has recently
received new emphasis. Apparently the doctrine need not be applied. It
has been held that it is a matter for each individual state to terminate the
wife's right to alimony under comity, by accepting the foreign decree's
provision on the alimony issue. 8 There is a split of authority as to
whether the foreign decree precludes the wife from obtaining alimony in
her home state.14 Even though the law of the foreign state holds that
the divorce terminates all rights under a maintenance decree,' 5 this law
does not affect the personal jurisdiction requirement of the home state.
And in a state where recognition is given to the alimony feature of the
decree, the jurisdictional issue is still open to collateral attack.' 6 However,
in New York it has been held that where the wife appears in the foreign
litigation, New York will give full faith and credit to the alimony part
of the decree. 17  And a wife is estopped to assert her rights under a
prior separate 'maintenance judgment if she obtains a foreign ex parte
5. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
6. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
7. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
8. 296 N.Y. 308, 73 N.E.2d 113 (1947).
9. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
10. Id., at 549.
11. 350 U.S. 568 (1956).
12. Thurston v. Thurston, 58 Minn. 279, 59 N.W. 1017 (1894).
13. Meredith v. Meredith, 204 F.2d 64 (D.C.Cir. 1953). But see Hopson v. Hop-
son, 221 F.2d 839 (D.C.Cir. 1955).
14. Precluding alimony: Dimon v. Dimon, 40 Cal.2d 516, 254 P.2d 528 (1953);
Shane v. Shane, 324 Mass. 603, 88 N.E.2d 143 (1949) ; Commonwealth ex rel. McVay
v. McVay, 117 Pa. Super. 623, 112 A.2d 649 (1955). Allowing alimony: Pawley v.
Pawley, 46 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1950) ; Pope v. Pope, 2 Ill.2d 152, 117 N.E.2d 65 (1954) ;
Isserman v. Isserman, 11 N.J. 106, 93 A.2d 571 (1952); Miller v. Miller, 186 Okla.
566, 99 P.2d 515 (1940) ; Nelson v. Nelson, 71 S.D. 342, 24 N.W.2d 327 (1946).
15. Herrick v. Herrick, 55 Nev. 59, 25 P.2d 378 (1933).
16. Esenwein v. Commonwealth ex rel Esenwein, 325 U.S. 279 (1944); Common-
wealth ex rel McVay v. McVay, 117 Pa. Super. 623, 112 A.2d 649 (1955).
17. Lynn v. Lynn, 302 N.Y. 193, 97 N.E.2d 748 (1951).
[VOL. 2.
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decree.' 8 Also, where the wife appeared in the foreign forum and con-
tested the issue of jurisdiction, she was precluded from again raising that
issue in her home state.19 In the instant case, the wife prevailed under
the New York statute,2° which the court considered not to be limited to
cases where the parties lived together in New York as their matrimonial
domicile.21 The important provision is that only the wife need live in
New York for one year before commencing her suit.22
The instant case appears to be correct in the light of the trend of
authority in the last few years. The first Williams case seemed to set
an important precedent as to the full faith and credit that must be given
foreign ex parte divorces. This sweeping pronouncement lost a great
deal of its initial impact in the second Williams case which established the
right to question the jurisdiction of the foreign tribunal. Then the Estin
case, followed by the Armstrong case, further limited the full faith and
credit requirement to the marital status only. Now the New York
statute, as contrued in the instant case, further limits the holding of the
first Williams case. Under this statute it is possible, as illustrated in the
instant case, for an ex-wife, having no previous connection with New
York, to remove there and, if her ex-husband can be personally served
or has assets there, to obtain an alimony award despite a prior divorce.
Thus, a strict divorce state is overcoming the effect of a divorce decree
granted by a liberal state by limiting the consequences of the divorce as
far as alimony is concerned. The situation now seems more confused
than before the decision in the first Williams case. A state can make prac-
tically any law regarding alimony and thereby limit the effect of a foreign
divorce in this respect. If the marital status is at issue, the divorce
decree can be completely nullified by attacking the jurisdiction of' the
foreign tribunal. And lip service is still paid to full faith and credit.
Thomas F. Burns
NEGLIGENCE-ARCHITECTS' AND CONTRACTORS' LIABILITY
TO PERSONS NOT IN PRIVITY.
Innan v. Binghamton Housing Authority (N.Y. 1956).
The infant plaintiiff fell from the porch of an apartment leased by his
parents from the Binghamton Housing Authority, sustaining severe per-
sonal injuries. Plaintiff, through his guardian ad litem, brought suit against
18. McKay v. McKay, 279 App. Div. 250, 110 N.Y.S.2d 82 (Ist Dep't 1952).
19. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948). See also Johnson v. Muelberger,
340 U.S. 581 (1951).
20. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT § 1170-b.
21. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 1 N.Y.2d 342, 135 N.E.2d 553, 556 (1956).
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the Housing Authority, the architects and the builder. In each case there
was a claim of negligence based upon the charge that the back porch of the
building was so improperly designed and constructed as to create a danger-
ous and hazardous condition for the users thereof, especially children. The
trial court dismissed the complaint against the builder and architects for
failure to state a cause of action due to the lack of privity between the
parties. On appeal the Appellate Division reversed, thereby extending
the doctrine of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,' which dealt only with
personal property, to structures erected upon real property. The court
said that, notwithstanding the lack of privity, if the porch was so improperly
designed as to create dangerous condition for users thereof, the architect
would be liable for injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the fall,
and if the plans were so defective that a builder of ordinary prudence
would have been put on notice that to follow them would create dangerous
conditions, he would be liable also. Inman v. Binghamton Housing Au-
thority, 152 N.Y.S.2d 79 (3rd Dep't 1956).2
Initially, it was held that when work was done under a contract, or
when goods were made and sold, the liability for negligence in performance
or manufacturing was restricted to those who were parties to the contract
or sale.3 Thus, a manufacturer was not liable to anyone except his imme-
diate buyer for damages caused by defective goods, 4 although he would be
liable to persons not in privity with him if the goods were inherently or
imminently dangerous to life or limb.' This general rule was rejected in
the case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.," which held a manufacturer
liable to the ultimate consumer if the nature of the product is such that it
is reasonably certain to be dangerous if negligently made. This is the
prevailing view today although the New. York courts have taken a
narrow view as to what is to be considered "dangerous if negligently made."
Liability is not imposed where the products are simple appliances in
ordinary use such as a beach chair,7 cigarettes,8 or a pair of shoes.9 In
early cases, the building contractor was treated similarly to the manufacturer
of chattels in that he was not liable to persons with whom he had no contract
for injuries occurring after he completed and turned the work over to the
owner, even though the injuries resulted from his negligent workmanship. 10
1. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
2. Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority, 152 N.Y.S.2d 79 (3rd Dep't 1956).
3. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
4. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Cannon, 132 Tenn. 419, 178 S.W. 1009 (1915).
5. Krahn v. J.L. Owens Co., 125 Minn. 33, 145 N.W. 626 (1914).
6. See note 1, supra.
7. Liedeker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 249 App. Div. 835, 292 N.Y. Supp. 541 (2nd
Dep't 1937), affd., 274 N.Y. 631, 10 N.E.2d 586 (1937).
8. Block v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 162 Misc. 325, 296 N.Y. Supp. 922 (Sup.
Ct. 1937).
9. Sherwood v. Lax & Abowitz, 145 Misc. 578, 259 N.Y. Supp. 948 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
10. Colbert v. Holland Furnace Co., 333 Ill. 78, 164 N.E. 162 (1928) ; Holmes v.
T.M. Strider Co., 186 Miss. 380, 189 So. 518 (1939) ; Curtin v. Somerset, 140 Pa. 70,
21 Atl. 244 (1891).,
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The rationale of this view is that the act of the owner in taking over the
premises is an intervention of an independent human agency which has
the effect of breaking the chain of causation between the negligence of
the contractor and an injury which might occur after acceptance." There
were certain well-recognized exceptions to this general rule. For example,
the contractor was liable to third persons not in privity with him if the
finished work constituted a nuisance,12 or if it was inherently or intrinsically
dangerous. 13 Although the courts have been extremely reluctant to apply
the MacPherson doctrine to building contractors, recent decisions have
placed them on the same footing as the manufacturer of goods. Without
need of privity they have been held to the general standard of reasonable
care for the protection of anyone who may foreseeably be endangered by
their negligence, even after acceptance of the work. 14 However, some
jurisdictions have refused to adopt such a position and still do not impose
upon a contractor liability to third persons after the negligently performed
work has been accepted.'- Although there is not much litigation on the
point, an architect was in the same position as a builder prior to the exten-
sion of the MacPherson doctrine and thus, he was not liable to third
persons injured through his negligent designing of a building after con-
struction and acceptance of it by the owner. 16
The mere fact that an owner accepts the finished work of a contractor
should not absolve the latter from liability to persons other than the
owner. It is unrealistic to say that a contractor's liability should cease
after the owner has inspected the premises and taken possession, since he
does not have the ability to ascertain if the structure is free from all defects.
The New York court properly adopts the modern view which finds no
reason for distinguishing between a contractor and manufacturer in regard
to his liability to persons not in privity. In holding the architect liable the
court has made a unique but desirable extension of the rule. However, in
so holding the court appears to have created an interesting problem. If
the plans were so defective that a builder of ordinary prudence should not
have relied on them, perhaps the risk created by the architect has ter-
minated.'7  Thus, we would have the odd situation of the architect being
liable if he presented the builder with a defective set of plans, and escaping
liability if the building was so poorly designed that the builder should
not have relied on them.
Francis P. Connors
11. Travis v. Rochester Bridge Co., 188 Ind. 79, 122 N.E. 1 (1919).
12. Schumacker v. Carl G. Neuman Dredging & Improvement Co., 206 Wis. 220,
239 N.W. 459 (1931).
13. O'Brien v. American Bridge Co., 110 Minn. 364, 125 N.W. 1012 (1910).
14. Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 166 F.2d 908 (3rd Cir. 1948);
Wright v. Holland Furnace Co., 186 Minn. 265, 243 N.W. 387 (1932); Foley v.
Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949).
15. Kolburn v. P.J. Walker Co., 38 Cal. App. 2d 550, 101 P.2d 747 (1940) ; Miller
v. Davis-Averill, 137 N.J.L. 671, 61 A.2d 253 (1948).
16. Geare v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir. 1926).








Frank R. lelleff, Inc. v. Braden (D.C. Cir. 1956).
Plaintiff purchased a brunch coat or smock at the defendant's retail
store. While she was wearing it at home the coat came in contact with the
burner of an electric stove and went up in flames causing severe personal
injuries. Plaintiff brought an action for breach of warranty of fitness for
purpose under section 15(1) of the Uniform Sales Act.1 There was a
verdict and judgment against the defendant for $65,000. The court of
appeals affirmed and held that on the whole record it was for the jury to
say whether the garment was reasonably fit, and upon its finding that it was
not, a breach of implied warranty of fitness was established. Frank R.
Jelleff v. Braden, 233 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1956).2
To establish a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose the Uniform
Sales Act requires that the seller be made aware, expressly or by implica-
tion, of the particular purpose for which the goods were purchased and
that the buyer rely on the seller's skill and judgment in selecting the par-
ticular item.3  Both section 15(1) of the Uniform Sales Act and its proto-
type, section 14(1) of the English Sales of Goods Act, represent attempts
to codify the common law.4 In England, at the time of the codification,
the courts were just beginning to recognize the implied warranty of fitness
where the seller was a dealer; 1 while at the time of the codification in the
United States an implied warrany was recognized 0 but many courts en-
forced it only when the seller was a manufacturer.7 Generally the recovery
permitted in an action for breach of warranty of fitness is the difference
between the value of the goods delivered to the buyer and the value of goods
conforming to the warranty.8  However, the Sales Act also authorizes
1. The action was actually brought under D.C. CODE § 28-1115(1) (1951) which
is the same as § 15(1) of the Sales Act.
2. Frank R. Jelleff, Inc. v. Braden, 233 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
3. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 15(1). This corresponds to UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-315 which is somewhat broader on the point of reliance. The requirement of
reliance is fulfilled by relying on the seller to select or to furnish suitable goods. The
Code would impose the warranty if the seller knows or has reason to know the buyer's
purpose.
4. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 227 (rev. ed. 1948).
5. Brown v. Edgington, 2 Man. & G. 279, 133 Eng. Rep. 751 (C.P. 1841) ; Smith
v. Baker, Son and Death, 40 L.T.R. (n.s.) 261-263 (D.C. 1878) (dictum). See Randall
v. Newson, 2 Q.B.D. 102 (1877).
6 Murchie v. Cornell, 155 Mass. 60, 29 N.E. 207 (1891) ; Toledo Computing Scale
Co. v. Frederickson, 95 Neb. 639, 146 N.W. 957 (1914). See Dushane v. Benedict, 120
U.S. 630 (1887).
7. Little v. G. E. Van Syckle & Co., 115 Mich. 480, 73 N.W. 554 (1898) ; Hoe v.
Sanborn 21 N.Y. 552, 78 Am. Dec. 163 (1860) ; Sellers v. Stevenson, 163 Pa. 262, 29
Atl. 715 (1894).
8. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 69 (7). The Corresponding UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
sections are §§ 2-714, 715 (2) (b) and are similar to provisions of the UNIFORM SALES
ACT as to consequential damages for a breech of warranty but modify the rule by
requiring that the buyer make a good faith attempt to minimize his damages.
278 ,. [VOL. 2.
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recovery of special damages.9 Such damages may be in the nature of tort
damages for personal injury. In the leading case of Kurriss v. Conrad &
Co.,1 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts permitted the recovery
of consequential damages against a retailer for a skin rash caused by a dye
or poisonous substance found to be present in a dress sold to the plaintiff.
In imposing such an onerous burden on a retail seller, the courts state
that they are merely placing the responsibility on the party to the contract
who is best able to protect himself against the wrong "and to recoup
himself in case of loss because he knows and comes in touch with the
manufacturer." 11 Courts also assert that such a rule will promote public
safety since the retailer, knowing he will be held liable for a breach, will
take steps to deal only in goods that meet the requirements of this
warranty.
12
While the decision in the instant case is sound and in accord with the
development of the law on this subject it is not novel in this jurisdiction and
is controlled by the earlier case of Deffebach v. Lansburgh & Bro.13 Diffi-
culty in this area of sales law arises from the statutory language of fitness
for a "particular purpose." 14 The phrase carries an implication that the
warranty runs only to commercial imperfections in the coat. 15 However,
the decisions of the courts exact more than this. They go beyond the purely
commercial aspects of the goods and, although using the same statutory
language, impose a warranty covering all possible use-hazards. A more
adequate wording would impose a warranty running to "all qualities" of
the merchandise. Such a warranty would more accurately reflect the law
as it is being applied and would also result in the recognition of the retailer
as an insurer against defects in the goods he sells which create a risk of
personal injury. The case vividly illustrates the difficult position in which
a merchant may find himself and it gives an indication of the increasingly
important role of products liability insurance, not only for manufacturers,
but also for retail sellers.
Paul W. Callahan
9. UNIFORM SALIs ACT §§ 69(7), 70.
10. 312 Mass. 670, 46 N.E.2d 12 (1942). See also Deffebach v. Lansburgh & Bro.,
150 F.2d 591 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Cushing v. Rodman, 82 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1936);
Flynn v. Bedell Co., 242 Mass. 450, 136 N.E. 252 (1922) ; Ward v. Great Atlantic and
Pacific Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 120 N.E. 225 (1918) ; Zirpola v. Adam Hat Stores, Inc.,
122 N.J.L. 21, 44 A.2d 73 (1939); Ganoung v. Daniel Reeves, Inc., 149 Misc. 515, 268
N.Y.S. 325 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1933). Cf. Ringstad v. I. Magnin & Co., 39 Wash.2d
923, 239 P.2d 848 (1952).
11. Ward v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 94, 120 N.E. 225,
226, (1918) (dictum).
12. Chapman v. Roggenkamp, 182 Ill. App. 117, 121 (1931) (dictum); Llewellyn,-
On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 COLUM, L. Rrv. 699, 712 (1936); Waite,
Retail Responsibility and Judicial Law Making, 34 MICH. L. Rzv. 494, 508-14 (1936).
13. 150 F.2d 591 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
14. See Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 37 COLUM. L. R-y. 341,
381 (1937).
15. See Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 COLUM. L. REv. 699
(1936) and 37 COLUM. L. Rgv. 341 (1937) for a discussion of the purely commercial
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TORTS-CONTRIBUTION AMONG JOINT TORTFEASORS--
RETENTION OF A RELEASED DEFENDANT.
Davis v. Miller (Pa. 1956).
In an action for personal injuries the original defendant joined as
additional defendant the driver of the car in which plaintiffs were riding
when the accident occurred. The additional defendant introduced in her
pleadings releases received from the plaintiffs and from the original de-
fendant. Her motion for judgment on the pleadings was sustained and she
was discharged from the case. On appeal the supreme court held the
original defendant had a right to require that the additional defendant
remain in the action since, even though he could not recover contribution
from her, his liability to the plaintiffs would be halved if he could estab-
lish that she was a joint tortfeasor. Davis v. Miller, 385 Pa. 348, 123
A.2d (1956).'
The right of contribution among joint tortfeasors did not exist at
common law.2 Under early statutes permitting it, a release of one joint
tortfeasor released the others.3  But under the Uniform Contribution
Among Joint Tortfeasors Act 4 a release given to one joint tortfeasor does
not discharge from liability anyone not a party to it.5 Any consideration
paid for a release will reduce to that extent the total claim for damages
recoverable against those not released. 6 If the consideration paid is less
than the released party's pro-rata share, he will be required, either in a
separate action or by being made a third party defendant in the original
action, to make up any difference the party not released may be called upon
to pay.7 Hence, if the release provides for a reduction in damages re-
1. Davis v. Miller, 385 Pa. 348, 123 A.2d 422 (1956).
2. Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago B. & 0. R.R., 196 U.S. 217 (1905);
Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Chapman, 167 Ore. 661, 120 P.2d 223 (1941) ; Borough of Oak-
dale v. Gamble, 201 Pa. 289, 50 Atl. 971 (1902).
3. Rushford v. United States, 204 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1953); Bee v. Cooper, 217
Cal. 96, 17 P.2d 740 (1932) ; Union of Russian Soc. of St. Michael & St. George v.
Koss, 348 Pa. 574, 36 A.2d 433 (1944).
4. The act has been adopted in the following states: Ark. 1941; Del. 1949; N.M.
1947; Pa. 1951; R.I. 1940; and S.D. 1945.
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2085 (Supp. 1955). "A release by the injured person of
one joint tortfeasor . . . does not discharge the other tortfeasors unless the release so
provides, but reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors in the amount of the con-
sideration paid for the release or in any amount or proportion by which the release
provides that the total claim shall be reduced . . ." Raughley v. Delaware Coach Co. 47
Del., 343, 91 A.2d 245 (1952) ; Maryland Lumber Co. v. White, 205 Md. 180, 107 A.2d
73 (1954).
6. Ibid.
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2086 (Supp. 1955). "A release by the injured person
of one of the joint tortfeasors does not relieve him from liability to make contribution
to another tortfeasor, unless the release ... provides for a reduction to the extent of
the pro-rata share of the released tortfeasor of the injured person's damages recoverable
against all other tortfeasors." Smith v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 173 F.2d 721 (3rd
Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 819 (1949). Pennsylvania disregards comparative negli-
gence of joint tortfeasors and makes each equally liable. Puller v. Puller, 380 Pa. 219,
110 A.2d 175 (1955).
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coverable against those not named in the release equal to the released
party's pro-rata share there is no necessity to enforce a right of contribu-
tion." Where one joint tortfeasor gives the other a general release the rea-
son for denying any right of contribution is more emphatic.9
The instant case presents a conflict between the right of the original
defendant to benefit from plaintiffs' releases to the additional defendant if
the additional defendant was a joint tortfeasor and the right of the addi-
tional defendant to remain out of the action since she has settled her lia-
bility with all who can recover from her. The Uniform Act does not pro-
vide any procedure whereby a tortfeasor can assert in mitigation of damages
a release given to a third party, until he shows that the third party was
jointly liable with him.' 0 The parties could have, by stipulation, agreed
to discharge the additional defendant and hold the original defendant re-
sponsible for only one-half of plaintiffs' damages should he be found to be
liable at all. Since this was not done, to insure original defendant's right
not to be required to pay more than his pro-rata share if he is only a joint
tortfeasor, the court properly retained the additional defendant until her
liability in the absence of a release could be adjudicated. A contrary
decision would, in effect, construe the original defendant's release to the
additional defendant as a surrender of the original defendant's right under
the Uniform Act to a pro-rata decrease in his liability to the plaintiffs.
Edward G. Mekel
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT
MATTER-ESTOPPEL TO DENY JURISDICTION BY ACCEPTING AWARD.
Hart v. Thomasville Motors, Inc. (N.C. 1956).
The plaintiff was injured while working as a carpenter in the garage
of the defendant. The defendant paid, and the plaintiff received and ac-
cepted, compensation as provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Subsequently plaintiff moved to set aside the award on the ground that the
commission had no jurisdiction to grant it because plaintiff was not an
employee of defendant, but an independent contractor. A deputy commis-
sioner found for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed to the full
8. On a motion by the plaintiff a released defendant was dismissed from the case
with prejudice towards plaintiff's claim against the remaining defendant. Fleck v.
Marzano, 108 F. Supp. 556 (D.C. Pa. 1953) ; Smootz v. Ienni, 37 N.J. Super. 529, 117
A.2d 675 (1955) ; accord, Judson v. Peoples Bank and Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d
24 (1954) ; Stroh v. Loose, 67 Dauph. 103, 2 D. & C. 2d 157 (1954).
9. Killian v. Catanese, 375 Pa. 593, 101 A.2d 379 (1954). Contra, Derby v.
Matushonek, 42 Luz. L. Reg. 19, 80 D. & C. 272 (1951); Erbaugh v. Lefever, 17
Monroe L. R. 54, 103 P.L.J. 387 (1956). The difficulty is in ascertaining whether the
releasor intended his release to extend to any right of contribution that may accrue.
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commission which affirmed the decision. On appeal to the Supreme Court
of North Carolina, it was held that the plaintiff, in accepting the compensa-
tion awarded by the commission, was not estopped from attacking its juris-
diction on the ground that he was an independent contractor, and there-
fore, not subject to the Workmen's Compensation Act. Hart v. Thomas-
ville Motors, Inc., 93 S.E.2d 673 (N.C. 1956). 1
The jurisdiction of a court over a particular subject matter stems from
the legislative act (or constitutional provision) which brings the tribunal
into being. This jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine cases
of the general class to which the proceeding in question belongs.2  Since
this power is granted to the courts by law, it is generally held that it can-
not be acquired by estoppel,3 or consent and waiver 4 of the parties to the
action. There is some authority, however, that this jurisdiction may be
acquired by something akin to estoppel.5 The judgment of a court without
jurisdiction is void 6 and may be attacked whenever it is asserted. 7  Indus-
trial commissions are viewed as courts of limited jurisdiction whose au-
thority and jurisdiction are established by the legislature, The commis-
sions are under the same restrictions as the courts in matters of jurisdiction
and can acquire it neither by consent and waiver, estoppel,9 nor stipula-
tion.' An award made by a commission without jurisdiction is likewise
a nullity 11 and, may be assailed at any time.12  However, not all courts
are of the same opinion on this question. Some take the view that once a
1. Hart v. Thomasville Motors, Inc., 93 S.E.2d 673 (N.C. 1956).
2. Peterson v. Falzarano, 6 N.J. 447, 79 A.2d 50 (1950).
3. Simmons v. Friday, 359 Mo. 812, 224 S.W.2d 90 (1949); Brown v. Brown,
281 S.W.2d 492 (Tenn. 1955).
4. Dever v. Bowers, 341 Ill. App. 444, 94 N.E.2d 518 (1950); McKim v. Petty,
242 Iowa 599, 45 N.W.2d 157 (1950) ; Bodwell-Leighton Co. v. Coffin & Wimple Inc.,
114 Me. 367, 69 A.2d 567 (1949).
5. T.J. Dye & Son v. Nicholas, 89 Ind. App. 13, 141 N.E. 259 (1923) ; Bledsoe v.
Seaman, 77 Kan. 679, 95 Pac. 567 (1908) ; Dean v. Dean, 136 Ore. 694, 300 Pac. 1027
(1931) ; Wells v. Wells, 2 Utah 2d 241, 272 P.2d 167 (1954).
6. Samson v. Bergin, 138 Conn. 306, 84 A.2d 273 (1951) ; Royal Indemnity Co. v.
Savannah, 209 Ga. 383, 73 S.E.2d 205 (1952) ; Green v. Walsh, 5 Ill. App.2d 535, 126
N.E.2d 398 (1955).
7. Nye v. Nye, 411 11. 408, 105 N.E.2d 300 (1952) ; Haefele v. Davis, 373 Pa.
34, 95 A.2d 195 (1953) ; Tescher v. Kijurina, 365 Pa. 480, 76 A.2d 197 (1950).
8. Industrial Comm'n v. Plains Utility Co., 127 Colo. 506, 259 P.2d 282 (1953);
Chadwick v. Dept. of Conservation, 219 N.C. 766, 14 S.E.2d 843 (1941) ; Sheehan v.
Industrial Comm'n, 272 Wis. 595, 76 N.W.2d 343 (1956).
9. Eastern Coal Corp. v. Morris, 287 S.W.2d 603 (Ky. 1956) ; Rosenberry v. Gil-
lian Bros., 130 Pa. Super. 469, 197 Atl. 523 (1938) ; Welhouse v. Industrial Comm'n,
214 Wis. 163, 252 N.W. 717 (1934).
10. Partin's Adm'r v. Black Mountain Corp., 237 Ky. 556, 36 S.W.2d 1, (1931);
Seiler v. Otis Elevator Co., 281 App. Div. 140, 120 N.Y.S. 2d 325 (3rd Dep't 1952);
Waldum v. Lake Superior Terminal & Transfer Ry..Co., 169 Wis. 137, 170 N.W. 729
(1919).
11. Industrial Comm'n v. Plains Utility Co., 127 Colo. 506, 259 P.2d 282 (1953);
Hardman v. Industrial Comm'n, 60 Utah 203, 207 Pac. 460 (1922).
12. State v. Review Board, 230 Ind. 1, 101 N.E.2d 60 (1951) ; Pine v. Industrial
Comm'n, 108 Okla. 185, 235 Pac. 617 (1925); Kutt v. Beaumont Birch Co., 177 Pa.
Super. 352, 110 A.2d 816 (1955).
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party has placed himself before the commission, he will not be heard to
deny its jurisdiction. 13
In the instant case, the Workmen's Compensation Act 14 did not apply
to independent contractors, and the commission was without jurisdiction
over the claim. While the decision is supported by the weight of authority
it is unfortunate that the court did not adopt the reasoning of the concurring
judge. He would distinguish between conferring jurisdiction by agree-
ment, and making stipulations of fact which, if true, bring the proceeding
within the statutory jurisdiction of the commission. 15 Thus, an estoppel
would arise, not to confer jurisdiction, but to deny the facts which have
been stipulated. This view is more in keeping with justice in that it would
prevent the parties from denying, without show of good reason,", the
stipulation on the strength of which the commission assumed jurisdiction. 1T
In this way, not only would the employee be protected in his award, but
the employer too would be secure in the finality of the commission's decision
in a manner consonant with both the letter and spirit of the statute.
Anthony L. V. Picciotti
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR
WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT-ALLOWING RECOVERY FOR
CANCER INDUCED BY AN INJURY.
Charleston Shipyards, Inc. v. Lawson (E.D.S.C. 1955).
On January 18, 1952, claimant, in the course of his employment,
stepped heavily on a piece of steel injuring the sole of his right foot. At
the time of the injury, claimant had on this foot a wart-like lesion which
had been present for many years, though it had never been painful or
troublesome. The injury to the foot tore this lesion partially loose from
the surrounding tissue. 'On January 28th the attending physician excised
the lesion, and a laboratory examination showed it to be malignant. On
February 4th claimant's right leg and the right half of his pelvis were
amputated. The deputy commissioner found that the injury of January
18th activated and accelerated the pre-existing lesion, thus necessitating
13. Ray v. Hillman, 229 Ala. 424, 157 So. 676 (1934) ; T.J. Dye & Sons v.
Nicholas, 89 Ind. App. 13, 141 N.E. 259 (1923).
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-3 (Supp. 1953).
15. Hart v. Thomasville Motors, Inc., 93 S.E.2d 673 (N.C. 1956) (concurring
opinion).
16. The court did not consider the question of what constitutes "good reason."
See Robertson v. Smith, 129 Ind. 422, 28 N.E. 857 (1891) ; Winston Motor Carriage Co.
y. Blomberg, 84 Wash. 451, 147 Pac. 21 (1915).
17. REST'rATMENT, CONVLICT Op LAWS §'81, comment g (1934); RESTATXMENT,
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the amputation. Under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act,' he ordered the employer, Charleston Shipyards, Inc., and
the insurer, American Casualty Co., to pay claimant twenty dollars per
week for the entire period of his total disability. Employer and insurer
filed a petition to enjoin the order, and the court suspended payments
required under the compensation award pending final disposition by the
court. The district court held that, though the cancerous condition could
not medically be positively attributed to the injury, in view of the suffi-
ciency of nonmedical circumstantial evidence, the award would be sus-
tained as supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a
whole. Charleston Shipyards, Inc. v. Lawson, 141 F. Supp. 764 (E.D.S.C.
1955) .2
The basis for compensation laws is that accidents in industry are in-
evitable, and that society has a duty to protect the victims of such mishaps.3
The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act 4 is in line
with the trend, begun some decades ago, aiming to place the burden of
industrial injuries on industry itself and ultimately on society whom it
serves." It was enacted to provide compensation for the various types of
longshoremen and harbor workers to whom state compensation statutes
did not apply.0 The courts have given the act a liberal construction in
furtherance of its purpose,7 and have declared that any doubts should be
resolved in favor of the workman." An "accidental injury," within the
act, 9 includes injuries sustained by employees who are suffering from
physical infirmities, though the injury would not have occurred but for
the physical weakness.' Compensation is granted for any aggravation or
activation of a previous condition, provided it can be said that the aggrava-
tion arose out of the employment." Thus, the deputy commissioner has
allowed compensation for claims based on aggravation of latent conditions
1. 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1952).
2. Charlestown Shipyards, Inc. v. Lawson, 141 F. Supp. 764 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
3. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Burris, 59 F.2d 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
4. 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1952).
5. See Baltimore & Phila. Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U.S. 408, 414 (1932);
Didier v. Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co., 15 F. Supp. 91 (S.D. Cal. 1936).
6. State law cannot validly provide for recovery through workmen's compensation
proceedings for an injury sustained while a worker is engaged in maritime employment
on navigable waters of the United States. Nogueira v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 281
U.S. 128, 131 (1929).
7. Baltimore & Phila. Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U.S. 408, 414 (1932) ; accord,
Kobilkin v. Pillsbury, 103 F.2d 667, 670 (9th Cir. 1939).
8. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Burris, 59 F.2d 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
9. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 STAT. 1424 (1927),
33 U.S.C. § 902(2) (1952).
10. Hoage v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 64 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1933)
(arteriosclerosis) ; Trudenich v. Marshall, 34 F. Supp. 486, 489 (W.D. Wash. 1940)
(coronary thrombosis) ; accord, Ocean S.S. Co. v. Lawson, 68 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1933).
11. Hoage v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., supra note 10.
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of tuberculosis, 12 syphilis, 13 diabetes, 14 and cancer itself.15 Where there is
substantial evidence supporting the finding of the deputy commissioner, the
courts will affirm that decision as conclusive.16 Under the statute, the court
is sharply limited in its review of the inference which the deputy commis-
sioner considers to be the most reasonable to be drawn from the basic
facts.' 7 Even though the court thinks the opposite inference is more rea-
sonable or more consonant with the facts, it cannot set aside the deputy
commissioner's inference if it is supported by evidence and not inconsistent
with the law.'
The instant case is the second one decided under the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act in which the courts have affirmed
the award of a claim for cancer.19 However, it is only one of a great number
of cases in which a commissioner or board has been faced with conflicting
medical testimony on the role of strain or trauma in causing or aggravating
this disease.2° In carrying out the benevolent legislative policy, adminis-
trative agencies and courts have refused to make any subtle analyses of the
causes of cancer-a subject on which there is no satisfactory expert testi-
mony -because of medical science's admitted ignorance of many aspects of
the disease. While the court in the instant case purports to apply a
"substantial evidence" test in upholding the finding of the deputy commis-
sioner, its use of the term "rational inference" implies a more liberal
standard. However, as medical science increases its knowledge of the
causes of cancer, the courts doubtless will require a corresponding increase
in the quantum and probative value of the evidence presented to the deputy
commissioner before finding that he had "substantial evidence" from which
he could "rationally infer" a causal connection between the injury and the
subsequent disease.
William J. Goebelbecker
12. Grain Handling Co. v. McManigal, 23 F. Supp. 748 (W.D.N.Y. 1938).
13. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Henderson, 128 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1942).
14. Avignon Freres, Inc. v. Cardillo, 117 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
15. Southern S.S. Co. v. Norton, 41 F. Supp. 103 (E.D..Pa. 1940).
16. Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 478-79 (1947); Parker v.
Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. 244, 246 (1941).
17. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 STAT. 1424 (1927),
33 U.S.C. §§ 19(a), 21(b) (1952).
18. Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 477-78 (1947).
19. The first case was Southern S.S. Co. v. Norton, 41 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Pa.
1940).
20. O'Neill v. Babcock & Wilcox, 19 N.J. Misc. 659, 23 A.2d 116 (1941); Ellis v.
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